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In a perfect being there can be no longer will. The presence of will is the sign of imperfection. Activity is the indication of incompleteness. All life is aspiration, but the end is to quench aspiration in completeness. To this end every imperfect being unconsciously tends by nature. The end is not peculiar to the individual, it is universal and essential. To become conscious of the end of one's nature, and to know the means of attaining it is to become free, for freedom consists in consciously willing the universal. By this principle moral judgment of action becomes possible, the nature of the good is determined, and whatever Kant has said to the contrary, a material theory of morals is possible.

In the remaining chapter of the book, M. Cresson institutes a comparison of the Kantian theory, on the one hand, with the Stoic, and on the other, with the Christian, ethics. Had he taken the same pains to give a just and adequate view of the latter, as he has given of the former, the result of the comparison would have been essentially different. He finds, however, that although the Kantian theory shows outward resemblance to Stoic and to Christian morality, it is really a very distinct system from either. The Stoic doctrine grounds moral obligation in reason and the constitution of human nature, the Christian, in the will of God, and solicits obedience by hope and fear. For the Kantian theory, duty is the last word, and must be obeyed purely for its own sake.

H. A. P. TORREY.

The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct. By ALEXANDER SUTHERLAND, M.A. In two volumes. London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.—pp. xiii + 461 + 336.

This book is a noteworthy contribution to the controversy regarding the relation between evolution and ethics. Its main thesis is that morality is based on sympathy, and that sympathy is evolved in the struggle for existence. Accordingly, in his preface Mr. Sutherland mentions Charles Darwin and Adam Smith as the writers to whom he is most deeply indebted. "Full half of the book is the detailed expansion of the fourth and fifth chapters of the *Descent of Man*." This expansion, however, has involved a considerable amount of independent reflection and research, and the view of ethics developed in the second volume shows even more clearly the stamp of the author's own individuality.

The first volume contains an explanation of the origin of sympathy, and an account of its growth from its first appearance in the form of

parental care to its most developed manifestations in general social feeling. In a world of ceaseless competition, parental care was necessary to render possible the survival and subsequent ascendancy of the more intelligent types. In view of the fact that a million creatures perish for every one that survives, it is plain that the most trifling advantage may ensure the survival of its possessor. "Under ordinary circumstances, the preservative feature will not be an advance in intelligence, for such an advance implies a greater intricacy of nerve organization, which cannot occur without an increasing period of immaturity" (Vol. I, p. 3). No doubt the creature of highest nervous type would be dominant if it once reached maturity, but the lengthened period of helplessness would be a fatal disadvantage in a world which swarms with dangers. And, if a more highly organized individual did chance to escape, its progeny, if inheriting the same higher development, would in general be less lucky. "But suppose that in the slow succession of ages a slight advance in nerve organization should happen to synchronize with a small tendency on the part of parents to guard their eggs or their offspring, the higher type might, and probably would, escape the dangers of its prolonged immaturity." Hence, Mr. Sutherland concludes, in the struggle for existence, an immense premium is placed upon parental care.

It is evident, however, that this argument simply proves that parental sympathy is necessary for the development of the higher nervous types. It does not prove that this sympathy originated as a direct result of the struggle for existence. The animal which receives the benefit of parental care will doubtless have an advantage, but the question surely is whether the sympathetic parent itself will have an advantage. When we are accounting for the genesis of sympathy, we have to explain the survival, not of the object sympathized with, but of the subject who sympathizes, and when we derive sympathy from the struggle for existence we have to prove that this quality is useful to its possessor. Natural selection, as Darwin insists, cannot develop qualities in the individual which are of no service to itself. Now the more care an animal lavishes upon its offspring, the more attention it diverts from its own self-preservation. The self-sacrificing parent will thus be placed at a disadvantage, and natural selection will tend to eliminate the unfortunate altruist. For this conclusion we have the authority of Darwin himself (*Descent of Man*, Ch. V). Hence, if the parent can devote attention to its young and yet survive, it is despite the struggle for life, and not in virtue of it. Since Mr. Sutherland derives general social feeling from parental affection, he cannot urge

that a sympathetic community will be more likely to survive than a more selfish aggregate; for the difficulty is to understand how natural selection can develop a sympathetic community if it tends to eliminate the individuals who first show traces of sympathy. In a general way this difficulty holds for any one who derives sympathy from the action of natural selection; for the question is whether natural selection alone can give rise to a sympathetic community, not whether it will preserve such a community when it has once been developed.

Leaving this question, which has so much significance for our general view of the world, we may now follow Mr. Sutherland's account of the expansion of sympathy into general social feeling. When parental sympathy has come into existence "the selective principle begins to lay new stress upon it, and slowly to divert it into the more indirectly preservative influence of conjugal sympathy" (Vol. I, p. 160). "The fundamental sympathies toward wife and child are still, even in the finest races of men, the deepest and strongest; but it was impossible that the nervous organism of animals could have grown susceptible to influences so delicate yet so powerful without giving rise to a more general capacity of sympathy spreading out to brothers and sisters, blood relations, and neighbors" (Vol. I, p. 291). The elaboration of this general position occupies the remainder of the first volume.

On the foundation thus laid the author proceeds in the second volume to construct his view of ethics. Sympathy is a natural form of morality. The man who never fails of kindness in his relations as father, husband, friend, and citizen is a good man. There are three higher stages he may yet attain: the morality of duty, that of self-respect, and that which springs from an ideal of the beauty of goodness. These of themselves are "weak and pretentious things" when they lack their natural basis—a true and warm-hearted sympathy—but on the other hand they supply in different ways the regulating force which sympathy requires; for the morality of sympathy is somewhat inconsistent, changing much with varying emotions and lacking the fixity of more developed feeling. The first advance from the stage of natural morality is marked by the emergence of the sense of duty. This arises when the sympathy of a race has found expression in maxims or in laws, while all the weight of public opinion has been invoked to enforce that conduct which is in accordance with the average sympathy. Under these circumstances the individual comes to look, not only inwardly for what his own sympathy dictates, but outwardly also to what the average sympathy of his race demands. The sanction of duty thus becomes external, and morality assumes a new

dignity when to sympathy and a cheerful compliance with duty there is added a complete surrender to that self-respect which is but duty with an internal sanction. Self-respect arises when a man who has grown accustomed to judge others by the standard of his sympathies turns inward on his own actions the same critical faculty. "Self-respect, though it has no new morality to teach, enforces the old with a peculiar absoluteness and absence of compromise. The sense of duty makes a man desire the commendation of the good, but a sense of self-respect makes him desire to be wholly worthy of that commendation" (Vol. II, p. 64). "But morality appears in all its noblest guise when upon these three there is superimposed an æsthetic glow, when the sight of right conduct awakens all the enthusiasm that kindles within us at the aspect of aught that is beautiful" (Vol. I, p. 111). Then a man seeks no reason for his allegiance outside of the nature of the thing itself: he feels that to do right is right and seeks no other guidance.

There is much in this that is valuable and suggestive, but there seems to be too much distinction and too little coördination. The principle of self-respect which is emphasized so strongly might well be made the central regulating principle of morality. Taken in its widest sense, it is capable of synthesizing all the active tendencies of human nature, and it does not seem possible to have a higher morality than that which springs from self-respect rightly interpreted. The æsthetic enthusiasm which the contemplation of goodness arouses is translated into moral action only when the man feels he owes it to himself to act in this way. The individual may be carried away by this æsthetic feeling, it is true, but if he justifies his action in a 'calm hour' it is on the ground that he acted in accordance with what 'he owed to himself.' On the other hand, action from duty is not moral at all if duty is a purely external pressure. Such action becomes moral only if the external becomes internal. It may be added that Mr. Sutherland has hampered himself at this point by his unfortunate terminology. Though 'selfish' actions are admitted to be necessary, sympathetic actions alone are called 'moral.' This leads to the needlessly paradoxical statement that right conduct is not always moral. It also undoubtedly confuses the author himself; for the associations which words acquire cannot easily be discarded.

It is impossible to discuss in detail the mass of facts and the numerous hypotheses which the author has brought into connection with his central position, and which have usually an intrinsic value. We have said enough to show that this carefully written book deserves careful

reading. The author possesses a clear and forcible style, and has the faculty of arranging material in a systematic way. This book cannot fail to be suggestive even to those who disagree with its main contention.

DAVID IRONS.

Democracy ; A Study of Government. By JAMES H. HYSLOP, Professor of Logic and Ethics in Columbia University. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899.—pp. xiii, 300.

The author of this book is one of those people who dislike and distrust popular government, and who attribute all the political evils of the age to democracy. He declares that "our institutions are a failure" (p. 278); that something must be done "to arrest the rapid progress toward destruction" (pp. 3-4); and that "democratic government requires radical modifications, if it is to fulfil the pretensions of its admirers and to escape the present tendencies toward anarchy" (p. 19). The particular evils he complains of are "unjust taxation, costly government, 'machine politics,' the organization of monopolies under state protective policy, degeneracy in the type of public officials, socialistic legislation, demagogic appeals to ignorance, and private greed and betrayal of the hopes thus encouraged, defiance of intelligent public opinion, blackmailing of corporations, conferment of special favors either openly or by indirection upon various business agencies, and perpetual meddling with the laws of trade and the rights of individuals" (p. 12). That is a formidable list, surely, and we are given to understand that all those evils are due to democracy, or, in plain terms, to the fact that the working men have a share in the conduct of affairs. To remedy the evils complained of, and save society from the ruin that assails it, is Professor Hyslop's object in writing this book.

In the treatment of his subject he shows a temper and a spirit of exaggeration, which are by no means favorable to philosophical discussion, and he seems to have written his book in a state of constant irritation. He affirms that "democracy, as it is applied in this and all other countries, involves, to consider it from the standpoint of universal suffrage, the government of the prudent, the intelligent, the property, and the social classes by the imprudent, the ignorant, the non-propertied and the antisocial classes" (p. 258). He declares that the average politician "too often has about as much honesty as the devil" (p. 233); and that "the single purpose that animates the average politician is the same that inspires the beggar or the thief"